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Between Fact and Fiction
The 26th Battalion, the “Crater Fight,” and the
“Myth of the War Experience”
CURT MAINVILLE
Abstract : In October 1915, during only their second tour of the front line,
New Brunswick’s 26th Battalion conducted a reconnaissance-in-force
upon a recently detonated German mine in front of their firing trench.
The “crater fight,” as it has come to be known, resulted in twenty-one
dead and thirty-six wounded but was portrayed as a success. But how
much of what was printed in local newspapers was true? Official reports
and personal accounts were engaging, idealistic and emotive. They were
also highly exaggerated. This was the genesis of the “myth of the war
experience”—a marriage of both fact and fiction that reflected multiple
(and sometimes conflicting) points of view and satisfied competing
personal, military, social and political interests.

At one point, under cover of smoke, a party of thirty men, under Major
W.R. Brown, of the 26th Battalion ... left our trench to examine a
crater close to the German Parapet, where the enemy was thought to
be carrying on some work. An enemy bombardment was in progress,
and heavy rifle and machine gun fire was opened on the party. Major
Brown was wounded in the advance, but continued to direct operations.
The crater was entered by a few men under Lieutenants Fairweather
and McPhee and rendered untenable to the enemy. The crater was then
evacuated.
—Daily Telegraph, 18 October 19151
1  
“Brilliant Exploit of Thirty Men from the Fighting 26th,” St. John Standard, 18
October 1915, 1. The same report was printed in all of the province’s six dailies and
reprinted in part in many of New Brunswick’s regional weeklies.

© Canadian Military History 2020

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2020

1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 4
2

T

Between Fact and Fiction

report of the Canadian Eye-Witness—one of the few
officially sanctioned sources of wartime information from the
Western Front—came as a pleasant surprise to New Brunswick
readers. It was the first mention of the province’s 26th Battalion
since that unit’s arrival at the front in late September 1915. It also
prompted Sir Sam Hughes, Canada’s audacious Minister of Militia and
Defence, to comment that New Brunswick’s battalion had “greatly
distinguished themselves.”2 But what exactly happened at this crater
and why was it significant? This brief illustration, hastily prepared
by Sir Max Aitken and his propaganda team at the Canadian War
Records Office from official reports of the 5th Brigade and the 2nd
Canadian Division, was notoriously short on detail. However, this did
not prevent the province’s newspapers from promoting the “crater
fight,” as it has come to be known, as a momentous event in both the
battalion’s and the province’s history.
The ‘real’ story of the crater fight was only brought to light
in early November, three weeks after the attack, when numerous
letters were published by local newspapers. Military censors managed
to obscure some of the more salient details, such as the location
of the attack. Nonetheless, many of these stories offered a vivid if
not contradictory account of what actually happened on 13 October.
Historical inaccuracies aside, these first-hand accounts were often
reprinted in multiple newspapers around the province, feeding an
insatiable public desire for news of the battalion’s baptism of fire and
incubating a sense of pride and purpose for the battalion. But just
how much of this story was true? Was the crater fight, as Captain the
Reverend E.B. Hooper claimed, “the first great toll of New Brunswick
blood for king and country ... a baptism of blood” or was it closer
he

“The 26th Battalion Won its Spurs: New Brunswick Battalion Wins Glory on
Battlefield by a Gallant Charge Against German Position, Which was Destroyed,”
Daily Gleaner (Fredericton), 18 October 1915, 5.

2  
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to what Lieutenant C.M. Lawson described to his mother—a “very
small affair” that “has been horribly exaggerated”?3
In truth, the crater fight was all of these things—a marriage
of both fact and fiction that reflected multiple (and sometimes
conflicting) points of view and satisfied competing personal, military,
social and political interests. Much was at stake, even as early as
1915: if the Second Battle of Ypres only months earlier illustrated
the lengths to which all of these forces would go to shape a unifying
Canadian narrative, then the crater fight demonstrates just how
much the official record and personal correspondence could be used
to promote an equally compelling regional mythology to the First
World War. Courage, self-sacrifice and success on the battlefield: these
qualities were the embodiment of the “myth of the war experience”
and necessary ingredients in the elevation of a relatively minor event
to a provincial sensation.4

the battalion
The 26th Battalion was New Brunswick’s preeminent First
World War unit, but it was not the first battalion raised in that

Captain (Reverend) E.B. Hooper, 17 October 1915, “‘He that is not with us is
against us,’ Chaplain’s Call to Men from the Front,” Daily Telegraph (Saint John), 2
November 1915, 3; and Lieutenant C.M. Lawson to Mrs. Lawson, 21 November 1915,
Lawson, JI – F105b – 3, Jessie I. Lawson Fonds, New Brunswick Museum. Lawson,
who was killed in action six weeks after the crater fight, was a harsh critic of battlefield
reporting. In this final letter to his mother, he made his feelings unmistakably clear:
“You talk about my writing to the newspaper or a letter for publication. Well in
the first place that is absolutely forbidden, and besides when one reads the drivel
that is published you never want to see anything of your own in print. Really some
of the stories about that very small affair at the crater are ridiculous. Certainly the
battalion gained credit there, but it has been horribly exaggerated. I am enclosing a
clipping from the “Telegraph” about the 25th [likely “Two St. John Homes Mourn
Dead in War,” Daily Telegraph and the Sun, 25 October 1915, 10] which is the
greatest balderdash. Really it discusts [sic] one, and a few fools who write this trash
home throw discredit on the whole.”
4  
Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 142. Vance was not the
first to speak of the “myth of the war experience;” he was, however, one of the first
to contextualise it from a Canadian perspective.
3  
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province.5 That honour goes to the 12th Battalion of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force’s first contingent. The 12th Battalion—more
a Maritime unit than a singularly New Brunswick effort—found
no difficulty in recruiting to strength when the call was made in
August 1914. However, as other units were forwarded to the front
with the 1st Division, the 12th was relegated to reserve status in
England where it served as a training depot for the reinforcement of
frontline battalions. The subsequent formation of the 26th Battalion
in October 1914, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt-Col)
James Lupton McAvity, carried the hope that it would serve at the
front as a distinct provincial unit.
It took considerably more effort to bring the 26th Battalion up to
wartime strength. Public perception was wary that New Brunswick’s
effort might once again be dismissed by military officials. Recruiting
was dulled by the province’s limited access to young, urban, Britishborn males—a paradigm that has come to define the typical First
World War soldier and who could be found in abundance in Ontario
and the Canadian West.6 Through the adoption of recruiting
meetings and more active methods to reach potential recruits in

5  
S. Douglas MacGowan, Mac Heckbert and Byron E. O’Leary provide a detailed
account of the 26th Battalion, including the famed crater fight, in their New
Brunswick’s Fighting 26th: a history of the 26th New Brunswick Battalion, C.E.F.,
1914-1919 (Saint John, NB: Neptune Publishing Co., 1995), 43-50. J. Brent Wilson’s
A Family of Brothers (Fredericton, NB: Goose Lane, 2019) builds upon this earlier
work by adding personal accounts, statistics and images that were not previously
available to MacGowan, Heckbert and O’Leary. Neither account delves deeply into
the controversies and contradictions that followed the crater fight.
6  
The wartime impression that Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) enlistees
tended to be young, urban, British-born males was supported by immediate post-war
statistical analysis. This distinct pattern or paradigm has been refined by modern
historians, including Robert Brown and Donald Loveridge’s inclusion of an economic
element to the equation and geographer Chris Sharpe’s groundbreaking analysis
of regional CEF enlistment, but remains largely unchallenged. Only recently have
historians attempted to measure and explain the impact of individual elements within
this pattern. The author’s own work reinforces the paradigm but simultaneously
exposes a number of noteworthy variations and exceptions. See Short History of the
First Canadian Division, December 1928, RG 24, Vol. 1810, GAQ 2-1, Library and
Archives Canada [LAC]; Robert Brown and Donald Loveridge, “Unrequited Faith
Recruiting the CEF 1914-1918,” Canadian Military History 24, 1 (Winter/Spring
2015), 61-87; C.A. Sharpe, “Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force 19141918: A Regional Analysis,” Journal of Canadian Studies 18, 4 (Winter 1983-1984),
15-29; and Curt Mainville, “The Middlemore Boys: Immigration, Settlement, and
Great War Volunteerism in New Brunswick,” Acadiensis 42, 2 (Summer/Autumn,
2013), 51-74.
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Scene on transport Caledonia. 26th Battalion Saint John Fusiliers Leaving for Overseas
Service, Saint John, New Brunswick , 13 June 1915. [New Brunswick Museum 19691]

rural communities outside of the province’s urban centres, the 26th
achieved its mandate by late fall of 1914.
The mobilisation of the 26th Battalion in Saint John was not
without its challenges. Morale among the soldiers and population
was generally high; discipline, however, was uneven. Desertions
were common. Soldiers, when not training, had much free time to
themselves. Evenings were a test to military and civilian police, who
were often overwhelmed in the presence of large groups of drunken,
sometimes unruly soldiers. Fights broke out. So followed acts of
vandalism and rioting. More than a few public calls were made for
the removal of the battalion from the city. The eventual departure of
the 26th for England in June 1915 was greeted with a genuine chorus
of cheers for New Brunswick’s battalion and considerable relief.7
Following four months of additional training at Salisbury Plain,
the 26th Battalion was sent to Western Flanders on 15 September
1915. Only months after the Second Battle of Ypres introduced
poison gas to the modern battlefield, British and German forces were
Wilson, A Family of Brothers, 23-37.

7  
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Soldiers of the 26th Battalion dig trenches during training in southern England, summer
1915. [Captain F.F. May Collection, 26th Battalion Overseas Association Inc.]

now firmly entrenched into defensive positions that made wholesale
attack difficult. The 5th Canadian Brigade inherited ground formerly
held by the British 83rd Brigade in the Ypres Salient. Within the
brigade, the 26th Battalion occupied interchangeable trenches with
the 22nd Battalion—six days in, six days out—overlooking the town
of Wytschaete, or “Whitesheets” as the British called it, only a mile
away. The battalion covered approximately 700 yards of frontage
along K and L lines. Ahead of them lay no man’s land, a narrow
corridor between combatants that ranged from as little as 60 yards
to approximately 200 yards at its widest. Beyond that was the 3rd
Bavarian Division. The 26th Battalion took the line for the first time
on 28 September with little incident.8 Their second tour would prove
considerably more exciting.

8  
War Diaries, 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade [C.I.B.], September 1915, Appendix
B, Operational Order No. 6, 27 September 1915, RG 9 III-D-3, Vol. 4883, Part 2,
File 246, LAC.
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the crater fight
On 8 October 1915, three German mines were detonated along the
Canadian line at Wytschaete. The first explosion occurred at 9:30
a.m. near Vandamme Farm opposite trench position “K1,” between
the 22nd and 25th Battalions.9 Two more mines were blown between
5:30 and 6:00 p.m. further down the line at positions “H4” and “G1,”
creating sizable craters in front of and behind trenches occupied by
the 28th Battalion. The crater at K1 was the largest, measuring
150 feet long by 45 feet wide and 30 feet in depth, but caused little
damage. Situated approximately 45 yards from the Canadian firing
trench, the crater was in the centre of no man’s land and posed many
questions for command: was the crater the result of a mine explosion
that fell short of its intended target or was it meant to serve as a
firing base for German forces as divisional headquarters suspected?10
That question was put to the 26th Battalion when they took over
K and L lines from the 22nd Battalion on 9 October. Over successive
evenings, as fatigue parties hastily constructed a sap from K1 towards
the crater, patrols were sent into no man’s land to survey German
activities inside the crater. The first, led by Lieutenant (Lt) C.D.
Knowlton, was detailed on the evening of the 11th. He was authorised
to attack the crater if his patrol held the advantage—500 sandbags
and a small working party were held at the ready to construct a
defensive position if needed—but an ominous development at the
crater favoured caution over courage:
Our party, which consisted of 2 officers and 15 men, as per Genl
[General] Watson’s orders, found the crater guarded by 3 sentries who
were behind an earth work almost 6’ high. There was considerable
difficulty in getting near. It was found that the top of the crater had
been boarded in and it was on these boards that sentries were standing.
9  
The actual location of the crater is difficult to pinpoint. Divisional references place
the K1 crater at map co-ordinates N.18.c.5.1. Brigade locates it closer to N.24.a.7.9,
approximately 140 yards away and inside German lines. Contemporary maps of the
area show a crater at N.24.a.5.9, between the two references. This fits the description
that the crater was centered midway between the Canadian and German lines.
10  
War Diaries, 2nd Canadian Division, October 1915, Appendix 25, Daily Intelligence
Summary No. 17, 9 October 1915, RG 9 III-D-3, Vol. 4842, File 99, LAC. See also, in
the same war diaries, Appendix 36, Daily Intelligence Summary No. 17, 12 October
1915: “There is apparently a determination on the part of the enemy to extend the
crater opposite K1 laterally along our line and to make of this the nucleus of a new
fire trench. Preventive action is being taken.”
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iii. Red Chateau

8

View of the front lines from J Trench (map reference point v.), looking north northwest to southeast. [Source images © IWM Q41949 - Q41957.]
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iv. Wytschaete Church
iii. Red Chateau

ii. Vandenberghe Farm

Approx. location of K1 Crater

i. Vandamme Farm

vi.

The Wytschaete front photographed from Vierstraat. [Source images © IWM Q37893 - Q37899.]
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ii. Vandenberghe Farm

i. Vandamme Farm

Approx. location
of K1 Crater

iv. Wytschaete Church
vi.

The Wytschaete front photographed from Desine Farm. [Source images © IWM Q37594 - Q37600.]
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Working parties (estimate 12 men altogether) could be heard humming,
singing & talking. Five explosions were heard at ends of crater—
apparently extending it along in front. By the time our party could
get to the position and get particulars it was very late and the party
could only get back to our trenches at 2 a.m. It was too late to deliver
an attack [unreadable] this place. [unreadable] appear to have a good
[unreadable] they could always reinforce their garrison—whereas we
have to cross open ground. The difficulties of taking and holding this
crater are very great at present. Mining from this side or bombarding
with H.E. [high explosives] seems only successful way of handling the
situation.11

Lt-Col McAvity’s follow-up report to 5th Brigade Headquarters
recommended an attack-in-force to displace the Germans in the
K1 crater. “The enemy appears to have made it bomb-proof,” he
advised Brigadier-General David Watson. “I am of the opinion that
only a very strong attack could possibly carry this place without
the assistance of mining or heavy artillery fire.” Both the Canadians
and the Germans appeared to be sapping towards the crater
simultaneously. If the Germans already held the position, McAvity
pointed out, then they would hold a distinct tactical advantage over
the Canadians: “the Germans can very easily reinforce a garrison in
the crater or they can very easily withdraw one, whereas, for us to
do either, necessitates crossing open ground and pierce the roof of
the crater. Our men would therefore be very easily bombed out from
the German lines.”12
General Watson, upon inspecting the crater, approved an attack
for the evening of the 12th. A small party, consisting of twelve men,
would approach the crater from the front to remove the sentries;
simultaneously, two larger parties of twenty men each would envelop
and bombard the crater from each flank. Meanwhile, two parties of
twenty-five men each would wait in the newly constructed sap and
in reserve to press the attack as required. McAvity understood the
“Report on Patrol in Front of KIA,” 12 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122,
Folder 4, File 1, LAC. See also 26th Battalion, Operations, 2 Memos, O.C. [Officer
Commanding], 26th Battalion to Lieut. C.D. Knowlton, 11 October 1915, RG 9 III,
Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
12  
26th Battalion, Operations, “Report on operations, night 11th – 12th October,
in connection with German crater opposite K1,” n.d., RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4,
File 1, LAC.
11  
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importance of fire support and advised Major (Maj) Walter R. Brown,
whose “A” Company would lead the attack, to position the battalion’s
six machine guns where they would be most advantageous.13 He also
cautioned Brown against overplaying the attack: “You are not to
attempt to storm the crater unless you are satisfied that enough
damage has been done by the bombardment to warrant.”14 For
reasons that are unclear—but may be related to an impending
“demonstration” by the British Second Army—the midnight attack
was called off.
That demonstration, a feint by Second Army to distract German
forces as the British massed on Loos, was scheduled for the afternoon of
13 October.15 It consisted of a ninety minute artillery barrage followed
by the deployment of smoke to obscure the battlefield. Machine gun
and “shrapnel fire” was encouraged “to make the enemy believe that
an assault is intended.”16 Within the 2nd Canadian Division, only the
26th Battalion had orders to enter no man’s land. The plan of attack
on the crater was based primarily on that proposed for the evening
of the 12th, with several modifications: firstly, one hundred men from
“B” Company were to be placed at the battalion strong point to
render assistance to “A” Company; secondly, the flanking party of
bombers was to be reduced from two parties of twenty to a total
of thirty men—the “picked thirty”; and lastly, the fifty men held in
reserve were not to wait for the crater to be secured, but would “rush
forward and fortify the crater and hold same at all costs.”17
This final point suggests that the attack may have evolved from
a simple reconnaissance-in-force. It implies, at least in the mind of
Lt-Col McAvity, that the crater held significant tactical importance,
enough to warrant the commitment of two untested companies on a
risky daylight attack. Not all of his officers were convinced that the
plan would succeed: “The day we picked to do it was perhaps the
26th Battalion, Operations, Field Message, O.C., 26th Battalion to O.C., A Coy,
12 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
14  
26th Battalion, Operations, Field Message, O.C., 26th Battalion to O.C., A Coy,
12 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
15  
G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of
the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1962), 121.
16  
War Diaries, 2nd Canadian Division, October 1915, Appendix 30, Canadian Corps
No. G 583 to 2nd Canadian Division, 11 October 1915, RG 9 III-D-3, Vol. 4842, File
99, LAC.
17  
26th Battalion, Operations, Memo, O.C., 26th Battalion to 5th C.I.B., n.d., RG 9
III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
13  
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worst we could have chosen,” explained Maj Brown to a Saint John
reporter after the fact. “The reason being that ... the enemy always
expects a general charge after a severe artillery bombardment.”18
McAvity, despite losing the element of surprise, was confident in
his plan and issued supplementary orders to each of his company
commanders: officers should be prepared to press any advantage to
take ground; adequate supplies of ammunition should be ready to
replenish all machine gunners and bombers; entrenching tools should
be handy in the event they are needed; and every soldier should be
provisioned for a protracted engagement.19
The bombardment commenced at 2:00 p.m., as scheduled,
concentrating on Petit Bois to the immediate south and east of the
K1 crater. At 3:30, smoke bombs were thrown over the Canadian
parapets at intervals of one bomb for every two and a half feet of
frontage. Canadian mortar and machine gun fire was soon matched
by German light and heavy artillery. The experience was intense,
if not erratic. “At times the earth fairly rocked under one’s feet,”
described Lt H.W. Ferguson of the battlefield around him, “especially
when those ‘coal boxes’ landed, throwing immense pillars of black
smoke and earth into the air for sixty to a hundred feet, digging
immense holes in the earth wherever they landed.”20 “I tell you it was
wild,” wrote Private (Pte) Fred Breau to his father. “It’s as bad as I
want to see it. I saw men flying up in the air.”21 Sergeant (Sgt) W.B.
Graham was charged with transporting high explosive bombs to the
soldiers of “A” Company in the front line: “The German shells were
exploding all around, with rifle fire, machine Guns, and everything
a human can invest. I was never so relieved in my life as when we
landed our load at the proper place.”22

“Major Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph,
27 December 1915, 6. He repeated his comments in a speech to the Rotary Club only
days later: “Some New Points in Gallant Story of Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph, 4
January 1916, 10.
19  
26th Battalion, Operations, Memo, O.C., 26th Battalion to All Coy. Commanders,
Machine Gun & Bombing Officer, 13 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4,
File 1, LAC.
20  
Lieutenant H.W. Ferguson to Rev. T.P. Drumm, n.d., “Twelve-Year-Old Pleads to
Go to Front as Bugler,” Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1915, 6.
21  
Fred Breau to James Breau, 17 October 1915, “‘More exciting than a Cove picnic,’
Writes Corp. Breau,” Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1915, 4.
22  
Sergeant W.B. Graham to his wife, 16 October 1915, “Interesting Letters from the
Soldier Boys,” St. Croix Courier, 11 November, 1915, 1.

18  
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At 4:00 p.m., Maj Brown led elements of “A” Company into
no man’s land and received a gunshot wound to his foot almost
as soon as he left the trenches. He kept moving. The two bombing
parties advanced first, manoeuvring left and right of the crater.
The reconnaissance party, under Lt C.E. Fairweather, with a
detachment of four engineers under the direction of Lt M.N. McPhee,
departed next and moved directly to the crater. The whole of the
battlefield remained obscured by dense smoke from the Canadian
line. According to Lt-Col McAvity’s official report to Brigade
headquarters, the attacking party was enfiladed from both sides of
the German line by machine gun and rifle fire but reached the crater
relatively unmolested. The flanking parties found the crater occupied
by German bombers who were driven back to their own firing line
through a communication trench that had been constructed between
the two positions. The reconnaissance party found no defensive
works of any kind in the crater and, seeing no value in holding the
crater, began their withdrawal to Canadian lines under heavy enemy
bombardment. No sooner had the crater been evacuated then a mine
was detonated inside the basin. At this point, the smoke screen began
to dissipate. More smoke was produced, but for several minutes the
attacking party was fully exposed to German fire.23 In the tense
minutes that followed, as casualties mounted, several men followed Lt
F.B. Winter’s call for volunteers to extricate the wounded.
Lt McPhee’s report of the crater fight offers additional details: he
noted that the size and depth of the crater was significantly smaller
than had originally been assessed—fifty feet in diameter as opposed
to one hundred and fifty feet long. While he makes no mention of a
communication trench running between the crater and German lines,
he confirmed that there was no tunnel linking the two positions—“I
had gun cotton in my sap head to move up and blow in any tunnels
we might find there. There was no tunnel and no sap.” McPhee’s
most important observation concerned the lack of a German defensive
perimeter inside the crater. “After we were in the crater for a couple
of minutes,” he continued, “the Germans started throwing in hand
grenades. They fell right in the crater. I do not know if there was an
officer of the 26th there or not, but I ordered all of the men out of the
26th Battalion, Operations, O.C., 26th Battalion to 5th C.I.B., “Report on this
Afternoon’s Action,” 2200 hrs, 13 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File
1, LAC.

23  
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Members of the 26th Battalionrush over open ground during training in England. [Captain F.F.
May Collection, 26th Battalion Overseas Association Inc.]

crater. We lined up on our side of the crater. There was no object in
holding it. It was nothing but a death trap.”24
Any idea of holding the crater “at all costs” was abandoned when
it was realised that the crater held no tactical value and that any
defence of the crater would have been costly owing to its proximity
to the German firing line. Lt McPhee made no mention of having
detected a German mine in his report; nonetheless, his order to
retreat could not have been timelier. “Our engineer officer yelled
out ‘about turn: it’s mined,’” wrote Lt Ferguson, “and two thirds
of our fellows got out before it blew up.”25 An anonymous observer
recounted the same story: “owing to the presence of mind of the
engineer officer with our party we might have lost more men than we
did. This officer gave the order (so I was told) to about turn and get
out of the crater.”26 The Germans detonated their improvised mine
26th Battalion, Operations, O.C., Report, Lieut. M.M. McPhee to O.C., 26th
Battalion, 13 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
25  
Lt. H.W. Ferguson to W.H. Ferguson, 14 October 1915, “Gripping Story of the
Soldiers Battles,” Campbellton Graphic, 4 November 1915, 1.
26  
Unidentified Officer, 14 October 1915, “Sergt. Ryder, of 26th, for V.C.,” St. John
Globe, 3 November 1915, 5.
24  
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only minutes too late. Pte William McKay says that he was the last
to retreat: “I was the last one to come out of the crater, and I just got
out in time, when it went up in smoke.”27
In both after-action reports, the critical moment in the attack
was not the assault upon the crater itself—that appears to have
been executed according to plan—but the withdrawal to Canadian
lines. Intermittent smoke exposed retreating soldiers to enemy fire;
consequently, the bulk of casualties among the attacking party
appear to have been rendered between the crater and the sap leading
out from K1. Lt McPhee reports having seen ten dead and wounded
upon his return to the line. Privates Maurice McPhee and Robert
Knowles lay lifeless on the edge of the crater. Pte Roy Brady, shot
through the arm within feet of the German firing trench, was buried
by a shell explosion and had to be dug out by his friend, Pte Will
Reid. Pte McKay says that he tried to rescue Pte Robert Keenan,
“but they played the machine gun on me and liquid gas, and my
clothes were afire four or five times, so I had to go back, crawling on
my stomach.”28
Casualties as a result of the crater fight were high, but were not
limited to the bombing and reconnaissance parties. At 5:20 p.m.,
German heavy artillery bombarded the Canadian line in retaliation
for the “demonstration,” resulting in considerable damage to the
front line and communication trenches. Machine gun officer Lt
A.D. Carter suffered shrapnel wounds to his hip and thigh. LanceCorporal R.F. Peacock was standing in the doorway of Maj Brown’s
dug-out describing how lucky he was to be alive when a shell landed
directly behind him, killing him instantly. “Had it not been for the
fact that he was standing there,” confessed Brown, “the shell would
most certainly have killed me.”29 In total, the 26th Battalion lost
twenty-one men killed and thirty-six wounded, equivalent to onehalf of a company. These numbers do not include those men who
were only slightly wounded and remained at duty and those, like Pte
Breau—who suffered a ruptured ear drum from an artillery blast—
who reported their injuries well after the battle.
Private William McKay to Robert McKay, 17 October 1915, “Twelve-Year-Old
Pleads to Go to Front as Bugler,” Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1915, 6.
28  
Private William McKay to Robert McKay, “Twelve-Year-Old Pleads to Go to
Front as Bugler,” 6.
29  
Kenneth Linton to Mrs. Amenia Linton, 16 October 1915, “If more men come we
will put on finishing touches,” Daily Telegraph, 3 November 1915, 3.
27  
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There was much to account for in the immediate aftermath
of the crater fight. In a secondary report from Lt-Col McAvity to
5th Brigade Headquarters, the officer commanding 26th Battalion
attempted to explain the apparent discrepancies between his reports
prior to and in consequence of the attack of the crater. McAvity
referenced the earlier reconnaissance conducted by Lt Knowlton:
“Reports which were sent in to us and forwarded on to the effect
that the top of the crater was boarded in and sentries were stationed
behind an earth parapet can now be accounted for by the fact that
sounds as men on boards would of course come from their parties
passing up and down the communication trench which led into the
crater. The sentries apparently stood on the near edge of the crater
looking out over the earth which had been thrown up all around.”
As for the unanticipated mine detonation, McAvity added that “[i]t
would appear that the Germans had expected an attempt to be made
on this place as they had a mine underneath it which they sprung,
fortunately for us, some seconds too late.”30
Lt-Col McAvity also wished to draw attention to the actions of
Sgt W.C. Ryer who, in addition to having recovered two wounded men
from the battlefield, claimed to have killed eleven of the enemy during
the engagement. McAvity’s commendation, registered with BrigadierGeneral Watson the day after the crater fight, is brief but trenchant:
“Sergeant Ryer, under a very heavy cross-fire from machine guns
and rifles, carried a mortally wounded comrade, Sergeant Cotter,
until the latter expired, when he left him and returned to the crater
and with the help of Private F.L. Daley, brought in another wounded
man, Private D. Winchester.”31
Major-General R.E.W. Turner, VC, commanding the 2nd
Canadian Division, saw tremendous value in the demonstration
executed by the British 2nd Army: “It helps materially in
encouraging the offensive spirit in all ranks and showed them how

26th Battalion, Operations, O.C., 26th Battalion to 5th C.I.B., “Additional
Report on Demonstration Afternoon October 13th,” n.d., RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder
4, File 1, LAC.
31  
26th Battalion, Operations, O.C., 26th Battalion to 5th C.I.B., “Re Conspicuous
Gallantry Sergeant W.C. Ryer (no. 69805),” 14 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122,
Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
30  
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easily the enemy can be upset.”32 He was similarly impressed with
the reconnaissance performed by the 26th Battalion, in spite of the
casualties. Lt-Col McAvity made no further comment or observation
concerning the crater fight. He may have been satisfied with the
days’ events, but his main concerns following the operation were the
need to repair his trenches, the continued extension of the sap head
from the Canadian lines to the K1 crater and the recovery of bodies
from no man’s land.33
Owing to the excitement of the afternoon’s attack and the enemy’s
agitation, the 26th Battalion was unable to retrieve their dead on the
evening of 13 October. Obscured by fog, recovery parties set out
under cover of darkness the following night.34 It was assumed, after
the retreat, that all of the wounded had been recovered and that only
the dead lay in no man’s land. That was not the case. Pte William
Ramsay, one of the party that attacked the crater, was determined to
return to no man’s land to retrieve the dead:
I later went out to the listening post and borrowed a pair of field
glasses; and when I looked through them I saw the dead scattered about
the field, that is between the firing lines. I heard some one groaning,
and I came back and reported it to Sergeant Wilson. He thought that
I was crazy.
I returned and reported that some one was living near the crater. The
crater is only fifteen yards away from the German trenches. Sergeant
Wilson came up that night and asked me if I was game enough to go
out, and I told him that I certainly was. We went out together and the
first fellow we ran across was Bobby Keenan. We rolled him over. He
was dead, so we crept by two or three more and went clean out to the
crater; and right on the edge of the crater lay [Pte M.E.] McPhee and
Bobby Knowles. I rolled McPhee over. He was dead.

War Diaries, 2nd Canadian Division, October 1915, Appendix 41, 2nd Canadian
Division to Canadian Corps, No. G [unreadable], 15 October 1915, Vol. 4842, File
99, LAC.
33  
“Major Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph,
27 December 1915, 6.
34  
Major W.H. Belyea, 18 October 1915, “Co-operation in Raising Three New
Battalions,” Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1915, 3.
32  
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I felt Bobby Knowles’ hand, and it was all covered with mud, and I
thought that he was dead too. But I felt around until I got the back of
his neck, and I gave him a roll over and he gave a groan. The Germans
immediately opened fire on us, so I got Sergeant Wilson’s jackknife and
cut all the equipment off him. I got him on my back and crept in with
him, Sergeant Wilson steadying him on my back.
When we got in with him there were two fellows, Corporal Knight
and Charlie McQuaid, who came out and met us for we certainly were
played out. So we took Bobby in Sergeant Wilson’s hut and rubbed him
down with some rum and got him around first rate. Sergeant Wilson
and I then went out and fetched in Bobby Keenan’s body. A relief party
then came out and brought in the rest of the dead.35

Knowles succumbed to his wounds the following day.
By the time the 26th Battalion left the line on the evening
of 15 October, only Sgt Cotter’s body remained unaccounted for.
Rumours circulated that he may have been taken prisoner; however,
as witnesses to his death stepped forward, this notion was quickly
discredited. According to Captain A. McMillan, “He lay nearest of all
to the German lines, and we think the enemy brought him in to get
information as to the force who attacked.”36 For the survivors of the
crater fight, it was time to reflect, to record their impressions of the
battle and to rest. More fighting was ahead.

the “myth of the war experience”
The crater fight was the 26th Battalion’s baptism of fire and, by
all accounts, they performed well: their attack was co-ordinated;
their reconnaissance was effective; and, while their retreat was
problematic, the engagement of supporting troops—the engineers,
machine gunners, smoke bombers and stretcher-bearers—helped save
many lives. Yet, in spite of the positive outcome, the crater fight was
a relatively minor event. It was narrow in both scale and duration

William Ramsey to Fred Ramsey, n.d., “Late Private Knowles Found in Crater,”
Daily Telegraph, 8 December 1915, 4.
36  
Captain A. McMillan to R.J. Cotter, n.d., “Lieut. F.M. Smith Got German Sniper
Who Wounded Him,” Daily Telegraph, 2 November 1915, 4.
35  
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Within weeks of the crater fight, dozens of first-hand accounts—most complimentary, some
contradictory—were published in New Brunswick’s newspapers. [St. John Globe, 3 November

1915, p. 3]

and its outcome offered limited tactical advantage. It may very well
have been the first trench raid of its kind within the Canadian Corps,
predating the Canadian raid at Petite Douve in November 1915, but
its lack of sophistication and the fact that it was conducted in broad
daylight with a large number of casualties ensured that it would not
be held up as a model of minor operations.37

See Colin Garrett, “The Art of Minor Operations: Canadian Trench Raiding,
1915-1918,” Canadian Military History 24, 1 (2015): 249-284. Garret does not
mention the 26th Battalion’s crater fight, claiming instead that the 7th Battalion’s
night-time raid at Petite Douve was the first trench raid of its kind. It is easy to see
why the latter draws considerably more attention: it was well planned and rehearsed;
it netted a number of enemy prisoners and intelligence; and it resulted in only two
casualties. This was the model of minor operations that was to follow with increasing
frequency and success.

37  
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It was the propaganda value of the crater fight that most interested
military and political authorities. War news, crafted by the official
Eye-Witness and filtered through government censors, reinforced
wartime ideals and helped boost military recruitment: “it was not
a huge ethical leap for reporters to provide, and their newspapers to
accept, ridiculously upbeat versions of battle,” explains historian Jeff
Keshen.38 More often than not, these reports were written in London,
far from the field of battle, and based primarily upon the after-action
reports of field commanders who had a direct stake in how the war
was being perceived at home. Criticism of the management of the war
or its human cost was generally omitted.39
Historian Jonathan Vance contends that such myth-making was
largely a post-war construction—“Strict adherence to historical fact
was desirable,” he writes, “but only if such facts did not contradict
the myth. It was the myth, not fact, that was paramount.”40 Yet,
curiously, battlefield narratives from official sources seldom found
any contradiction from the soldiers they reported upon. Letters
written soon after Second Ypres and Vimy, for instance, reinforced
common propaganda stereotypes of valour and righteousness while
simultaneously downplaying the more salient aspects of warfare.41
It mattered little that some of these soldiers did not actually engage
in the battle. They looked to newspaper reports and other sources,
such as Max Aitken’s highly flattering Canada in Flanders series,
for a better understanding of their own experiences.42 In essence, the
Jeffrey A. Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship During Canada’s Great War
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1996), xiii.
39  
Jeff Keshen, “All the News That Was Fit to Print: Ernest J. Chambers and
Information Control in Canada, 1914-19,” Canadian Historical Review 73, 3 (1992):
323.
40  
Vance, Death So Noble, 163.
41  
Ryan B. Flavelle, “The Second Battle of Ypres and 100 Years of Remembrance,”
Canadian Military History 24, 1 (2015): 224; and Maarten Gerritsen, “Corps Identity:
the Letters, Diaries and Memoirs of Canada’s Great War Soldiers,” (PhD dissertation,
Memorial University, 2008), 166. Self-censorship served a number of purposes. Jeff
Keshen notes that soldiers may have deliberately avoided entanglement with unit
censors by writing upbeat letters home. Others may not have been able to adequately
express their feelings, felt that no one could understand their experiences or were
too masculine to overtly state their fears and frustrations. Keshen, Propaganda
and Censorship, 189-190. See also Tim Cook, The Secret History of Soldiers: How
Canadians Survived the Great War (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2018), 171-172.
42  
See, for instance, his depiction of the crater fight in Canada in Flanders: the
Official Story of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, Vol. II (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1917), 38-40.
38  
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Editorials applauded the 26th Battalion’s crater attack and called upon its male readers to
embrace the war effort by enlisting. [The Daily Telegraph and the Sun (Saint John), 18 October 1915, p. 6]

circular nature of wartime reporting had the effect of fusing together
differing points of views, both fact and fiction, while sanitising them
for public consumption.
This was the genesis of the “myth of the war experience”: as much
as it unified the collective memory of soldiers still coming to terms with
their experiences in the immediate post-war years as Vance contends,
it was also a real-time phenomenon that amplified and satisfied
varied regional interests. Ypres and Vimy aside, local battalions and
figures were elevated to near-mythical status by city editors and
provincial newspapers for events that would have otherwise escaped
national attention. Minor engagements became cause célèbres—a
means of dealing with the death of people whose names were known,
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of engaging citizens with the war effort and of raising more troops
for the cause. Indeed, for New Brunswick, the crater fight came to
represent what Caribou Hill meant to Newfoundland.43
Editorials were quick to capitalise on the crater fight. “Last
week’s operations formed practically their baptism of fire,” boasted
the St. John Standard, “and a thrill of pride will go through the
province this morning at the intelligence that, when the opportunity
came, they did their duty in the manner expected of the men of
New Brunswick.”44 Similar sentiments were expressed in the Daily
Telegraph (Saint John): “The one point on which there is no doubt
is that the men of the 26th are standing up to the test of war like
veterans and are adding to the reputation established by the Princess
Patricia’s and other Canadian units which have been longer under
fire.”45 As the publication of casualty lists over the days and weeks
that followed began to dampen public spirit, newspapers held firm:
“Today, when we are called upon to count the cost,” assured the
Standard, “the pride is deepened.”46
First-hand accounts of the crater fight began arriving from the
front in early November. These stories were engaging, idealistic and
emotive. Depictions of bravery and self-sacrifice reinforced the public
impression being crafted by the province’s largest newspapers that
the 26th Battalion had won for itself, and by extension the people of
New Brunswick, a significant achievement. Everyone wanted to share
their experience under fire, but, as Fred Breau warned his father, “[t]
here was a lot of the men that were not in that fight.”47 So how much
of what was written in the aftermath of the attack was accurate?
Contradictions were evident from the start but, rather than undermine
the credibility of the witnesses, elements of the crater fight were fused,
transformed and recollected as an imperfect but accepted story.
Exaggeration was the hallmark of the Canadian effort, alternating
between portrayals of bravado and self-sacrifice. “The boys behaved
finely, doing their work coolly, helping comrades, laughing at their
wounds and swearing at the Germans alternately,” claimed Pte Jack
Tim Cook and Mark Osborne Humphries, “The Forgotten Campaign:
Newfoundland at Gallipoli,” Canadian Military History 27, 1 (2018): 1-39.
44  
“The Fighting 26th,” St. John Standard, 18 October 1915, 4.
45  
“The 26th Battalion,” Daily Telegraph, 18 October 1915, 6.
46  
“The ‘Fighting 26th.’,” St. John Standard, 27 October 1915, 4.
47  
Fred Breau to James Breau, 17 October 1915, “‘More exciting than a Cove picnic,’
Writes Corp. Breau,” Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1915, 4.
43  
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Willis two days after the crater fight.48 In the calm aftermath of
battle, more shocking features faded: the screams of the wounded
were replaced by thundering Jack Johnsons; bullets that buzzed like
bees around one’s head omitted the fact that Canadian fire routinely
found friendly targets; and Canadian casualties did not suffer so
much as endure, compose themselves and accept their fate with
dignity. According to Lt Ferguson, “One chap with a leg shot off
and two bullets through his stomach, smoked a cigarette and joked
about the wooden leg he would have to get now. He died about six
hours later, conscious all through.”49 Pte Frank Lockhart describes
another casualty “who had his leg practically blown off. This chum
talked and joked and thought he was all right. He died in the trench
with a smile on his face, while talking to [Pte] Whitehead.”50 These
depictions were hardly realistic, but they allowed soldiers to normalise
their experiences for public consumption.
The German response was portrayed in less flattering terms.
According to Pte Gordon Leslie, the Germans “ran and left their
trenches like sheep” when bombarded.51 Another account says that “a
lot of them jumped out of their trenches and tore off to the woods in
fear.”52 Both reports are prejudicial and highly inflammatory. Other
accounts are more conciliatory in how the Germans reacted to the
British demonstration: “The Germans, beyond a doubt, were caught
by surprise,” surmised Lt Ferguson, “but they quickly woke up.”53
“As the wind blew this cloud over their trench they began to rush
up troops to meet the attack they felt sure we were going to deliver.
Then we opened on these supports with rapid fire, machine gun and
artillery fire,” added Maj W.H. Belyea.54 “The Germans lost heavily
as they had brought heavy reinforcements up expecting a general
Jack Willis to Mrs. C.J. Willis, 15 October 1915, “Jack Willis of Sussex, Tells of
Brave 26th,” Kings County Record, 12 November 1915, 1.
49  
Lieutenant H.W. Ferguson to W.H. Ferguson, 14 October 1915, “Gripping Story
of the Soldiers Battles,” Campbellton Graphic, 4 November 1915, 1.
50  
Private Frank Lockhart to his mother, n.d., “Glace Bay Victims of Barbarity,” St.
John Globe, 17 December 1915, 3.
51  
Private Gordon Leslie to Mrs. Leslie, 16 October 1915, “Miramichi Boy Who Lost
His Life in Empire’s Cause,” Daily Gleaner, 4 November 1915, 2.
52  
Unidentified, 14 October 1915, “Sergt. Ryder, of 26th, for V.C.,” St. John Globe,
3 November 1915, 5.
53  
Lieutenant H.W. Ferguson to W.H. Ferguson, 14 October 1915, “Gripping Story
of the Soldiers Battles,” Campbellton Graphic, 4 November 1915, 1.
54  
Major W.H. Belyea, 18 October 1915, “Co-operation in Raising Three New
Battalions,” Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1915, 3.
48  
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attack. Our artillery played on their trenches and destroyed them
to the extent that when their reinforcements retired there [sic] was
exposed to our machine gun and rifle fire,” wrote Pte Elden Schwartz,
in charge of one of the smoke bombing parties.55 These accounts
reinforce the Canadian narrative. If the Germans ran away under
fire, then the Canadians are portrayed as valiant; if they remained
at their posts and were slaughtered, then they were simply outmanoeuvred. “I tell you they lost heavily, while our casualties were
few,” continued Pte Leslie to his mother, three days after the crater
fight. “[T]hey were carrying wounded out for two days,” added Sgt
H.T. Spare.56 Battalion, brigade and divisional sources are curiously
silent on the issue of how many Germans were killed on 13 October;
however, specific claims range from as few as 300 men to as many
as 5,000, concentrated mainly on Petit Bois. The Germans certainly
sustained heavy losses, but estimates above 400 seems exceedingly
high for the frontage along the K and L lines that would have been
covered by the 26th Battalion. Casualties directly inflicted by “A”
Company and those men in fire support would actually have been
quite light, limited to those enemy soldiers manning the crater, the
newly discovered communication trench linking the crater to the
German front line and as far forward as the German firing trench
facing the crater. Significantly higher losses were inflicted by indirect
artillery fire in the lead-up to the attack. 300 to 400 dead and a ratio
of four-to-one, as Lt Ferguson estimated, are the limit of credibility.57
Claims that upwards of ten Germans were killed for every one of the
26th Battalion, predicated on the notion that “there were thousands
and thousands of the enemy waiting and watching for them,” are
simply mythogenic.58
It comes as no surprise, then, that other details of the attack
do not hold up to scrutiny. Sgt Ryer’s assertion that he eliminated
eleven enemy soldiers inside German lines, for instance, may have
Elden Schwartz to Reverend A.S. Hazel, 18 October 1915, “A Few Lines from
Schwartz,” Carleton Sentinel, 5 November 1915, 1.
56  
Sergeant H.T. Spare to a friend, n.d., “9th Out on Muster Parade,” Daily
Telegraph, 11 December 1915, 3.
57  
Ian J. Campbell, ed., The Personal Diary of Lieutenant Harry Wensley Ferguson:
the 26th New Brunswick Battalion (self-pub., 2007), 221-222.
58  
Private William McKay to Robert McKay, 17 October 1915, “Twelve-Year-Old
Pleads to Go to Front as Bugler,” Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1915, 6; and “Major
Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph, 27
December 1915, 6.
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been exaggerated. Several testimonials support his claim, including
that of Maj Brown: “The fellow Ryer was missing. About an hour
later I heard that Ryer had turned up. So I sent for him and asked
him where he had been. He replied: ‘I found a nice little spot where
I could do a little potting; I found that as the Germans left the
trenches to throw their bombs I could see them and get a shot at
them. So I just stayed there and shot at them. I managed to bowl
over eleven of them.’”59 The smoke that obscured Ryer’s advance to
the crater, however, would have made it equally difficult for him to
identify specific German targets beyond his own attacking party.
As Lt Ferguson attested, “The dense cloud of smoke hid everything
from view excepting where here and there a swirl of air would reveal
the hurrying, moving forms, while all the time the air was alive
with rifle and machine gun bullets, shrapnel, shells and bombs of all
descriptions.”60 The smoke did abate as “A” company retreated from
the crater, but that hardly seems long enough for Ryer to snipe eleven
Germans from an open and fixed position given all of the movement
taking place in and around the crater.
Ryer’s claim to the Distinguished Conduct Medal is similarly
clouded in controversy. His official citation, published in the London
Gazette six weeks after the attack, makes no mention of the eleven
Germans killed, concentrating solely upon his rescue of “another
Serjeant, who was mortally wounded, until the latter died, when
he returned to the crater and, with the assistance of another man,
carried back a second man ... under a heavy crossfire from machine
guns and rifles.”61 Sgt Ryer’s story is certainly compelling: “I found
that I was alone and that the rest had gone back,” he told Maj
Brown, “so I thought I would look around a little first and see if
there was anybody I could take back. I found one man on the ground
but he said that it was no use, that he was done for. I stayed here a
few moments till he died and then I found another fellow who was
not mortally wounded.”62 The first soldier that Ryer came upon was
Sgt Frank Cotter; however, Pte William Mackay states that he was
“Major Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph,
27 December 1915, 6.
60  
Lieutenant H.W. Ferguson to Mrs. Charles Reid, n.d., “If more men come we will
put on finishing touches,” Daily Telegraph, 3 November 1915, 3.
61  
London Gazette, 26 November 1915, Supplement 29384, 11901.
62  
“Major Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph,
27 December 1915, 6.
59  
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the one who carried out Sgt Cotter: “I got him on my back with
the help of another soldier, but he got shot again in the head and
fell off my back dead.”63 This version is corroborated by Pte J.T.
Oram and by the Daily Gleaner (Fredericton) in its post-war review
of the 26th Battalion.64 Lt Ferguson appears to reconcile the two
stories—it was Sgt Ryer who rescued Pte Winchester and “one of
my bombers” who attempted to save Cotter—but, by this point, the
competing narratives had become conflated into a single, unifying act
of courage, deserving of the Victoria Cross “in any former war” if one
is to believe Major-General Turner at Sgt Ryer’s medal ceremony.65
The crater fight had now taken on a life of its own: it made heroes
of Maj Brown, Sgt Ryer and the “picked thirty,” it featured a popular
story that New Brunswick readers could embrace as their own and it
gave rise to its own poetry. It also proved to be an effective recruiting
tool. As three new battalions were being announced for the province,
soldiers of the 26th Battalion used the crater fight to appeal to the
duty of the province’s youth: “They are having a hard time to get
recruits, but if some of them saw the graveyards out here I don’t think
they would be satisfied to stay at home, they would want to have
revenge for our brothers who have gone before us,” proclaimed Pte
Kenneth Linton to his mother.66 “[I]f some of the slackers in Canada
were only here, to see, or could realize what we are up against, they
would not be so backward in responding to the call,” echoed Pte
Elden Schwartz to his pastor.67
Private William McKay to Robert McKay, 17 October 1915, “Twelve-Year-Old
Pleads to Go to Front as Bugler,” Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1915, 6.
64  
Private J.T. Oram to his mother, Mrs. William Oram, 17 October 1915, “Wounded
in Arm, Buried by Shell Fire, Roy Brady Went on in Crater Battle,” Daily Telegraph,
5 November 1915, 4; and “The Fighting Record of the Good Old 26th New Brunswick
Battalion,” Daily Gleaner, 17 May 1919, 8.
65  
“Presentation of D.C.M. to Sergt. Ryer,” St. John Globe, 23 November 1915, 5.
Turner was a recipient of the Victoria Cross for his actions on the Transvaal and
naturally viewed any act that mirrored his own reputation for “reckless bravery”
as deserving of the Empire’s highest honour. First World War standards, however,
proved considerably higher than those of the South African Campaign, as a more
detailed examination of Ryer’s actions clearly reveal. See Thomas P. Leppard, ““The
Dashing Subaltern”: Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect,” Canadian Military History
6, 2 (1997): 22; and Hugh A. Halliday, Valour Reconsidered (Toronto: Robin Brass
Studio, 2006).
66  
Private Kenneth Linton to Mrs. A. Linton, n.d., “26th Now in Fire Trenches,”
Daily Telegraph, 18 November 1915, 4.
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Private Elden Schwartz to Rev. A.S. Hazel, 18 October 1915, “A Few Lines from
Schwartz,” Carleton Sentinel, 5 November 1915, 1.
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Reverend Captain Hooper, the battalion’s firebrand and
popular minister, was a regular contributor to Saint John’s daily
newspapers. His appeals to manhood and patriotism were already
common themes in his letters home; his description of the crater
fight as “sorrow gilded with pride” and his call to support those
who “bring honor to themselves and their country in carrying the
flag on to victory, the complete victory” merely focused the efforts
of clergymen and editors at home to boost recruitment further.68
“These letters should fire the enthusiasm of the men at home and
make them realize where lies the path of duty,” extolled the St. John
Globe.69 “What do the young men of this city and this province think
about it?” responded the Daily Telegraph. “None can fail to read of
the bravery of the 26th without a feeling of keen satisfaction ... Let
every man who is free to enlist read the latest story of Canadian
gallantry and then take up the matter with his own conscience.”70
Such appeals, accompanied by interviews with returning veterans of
the 26th Battalion, helped increase recruiting above national levels
through December 1915; thereafter, as casualties mounted and the
number of able-bodied men declined, volunteerism would resume its
downward spiral through the last few months of the patriotic phase,
the conscription era and war’s end.71
The celebration that marked the return of New Brunswick’s 26th
Battalion to Saint John on 17 May 1919 was unlike anything the city
had ever witnessed, but, as the St. John Globe warned its readers, “[t]
he units that went away are returning, not it is true as they went.”72
The estimated 673 soldiers of the unit who marched from Union
Depot to King Square were eager to be home; only 121, however,
could be counted among the almost 1,200 men of the battalion that
had departed the Loyalist City four years earlier. These men had

Captain (Reverend) E.B. Hooper, 17 October 1915, “‘He that is not with us is
against us,’ Chaplain’s Call to Men from the Front,” Daily Telegraph (Saint John),
2 November 1915, 3. See also “The Fighting 26th,” Daily Telegraph, 3 November
1915, 6.
69  
Editorial, St. John Globe, 30 October 1915, 6.
70  
“The 26th Battalion,” Daily Telegraph, 18 October 1915, 6.
71  
Curtis Mainville, Till the Boys Come Home: Life on the Home Front, Queens
County, NB, 1914-1918 (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2015), Figure 1, 37.
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Poetry, written by those who witnessed war firsthand and those at home who could only
imagine it, helped shape the “myth of the war experience.” [St. John Globe, 22 February 1916, p. 7]

survived the Battle of the Somme and Vimy. They witnessed Hill 70,
Passchendaele, Amiens and the Scarpe. Then just when it seemed
that the war would never end, they found the will to march on
Cambrai on their way to Mons. But it all began with the crater fight.
At the head of the battalion marched Lt-Col W.R. Brown. He
had led “A” Company into the crater; now he commanded all that
remained of the 26th. Further in line marched Pte W.A. Ramsay
who was among the party that had recovered the dead from the
battlefield. Many names were noticeably absent from the arrival: Lt
C.M. Lawson, whose private commentary brought balance and insight
into the crater fight, was killed in action soon after the engagement;
Pte W.H. McKay, credited but never recognised for his attempt to
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rescue Sgt Cotter from the battlefield, died of a shell wound in 1917;
and Lieutenant (Captain) M.N. McPhee, the engineering officer whose
quick actions saved the lives of many soldiers, was later awarded the
Military Cross and drowned when the Hospital Ship Lanfranc was
sunk in the British Channel in 1917. Also missing from the reception
were Lieutenant (Major) C.E. Fairweather, DSO, MID and Sgt W.C.
Ryer, DCM. Both had been wounded and repatriated to Canada
during the war.
The crater fight may have done “more to arouse St. John and New
Brunswick generally to a sense of seriousness of the war than perhaps
any other agency,” as newspaper editors R.W. Gould and S.K. Smith
recounted in their regimental history of the 26th Battalion.73 Yet
its military significance is limited largely to its propaganda value
in uniting a province around the war effort and boosting Canadian
Expeditionary Force enlistment. Official histories written in the postwar era do not mention the crater fight; historians of First World War
tactics and minor operations similarly ignore the engagement opposite
Vandamme Farm. Only recently have the 26th Battalion and their
daylight raid merited wider attention. Like the German mine crater
at K1 itself, the crater fight appears to have been consumed within
the larger mythology of the First World War experience and the
collective memory of its participants.
As surviving members of the 26th Battalion Overseas Club
gathered each spring to celebrate the departure of the unit for England,
attention invariably turned from the crater fight to the larger battles
that were to follow.74 Published accounts of the Somme and Vimy in
the province’s newspapers represented the greater proportion of how
those events were interpreted in real-time and, after the war, how
they would be remembered. They too are filled with contradiction.
Most spared realism for self-censorship and high diction. The appetite
for such stories was insatiable and, as newspaper accounts filtered
back to the troops at the front, tales of courage and self-sacrifice
reinforced their own interpretation of events far better than anything
R.W. Gould and S.K. Smith, The Glorious Story of the Fighting 26th (Montreal:
Montreal Standard, 1918), 11. Lord Beaverbrook, Canada in Flanders, Vol. II
(Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), 38-40; and Roland H. Hill, “From Givenchy
to St. Eloi,” in Canada in the Great World War, Vol. III (Toronto: United Publishers
of Canada, 1920), 224 offer contemporary accounts of the crater fight, although it
must be said that their version of events are more quixotic than informative.
74  
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that might have provoked feelings of fear and helplessness. The crater
fight may have been the first to meld fact and fiction into a single,
unifying memory but it was certainly not the last for members of
New Brunswick’s 26th Battalion.
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◆

◆

◆
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